In 1218, the Khwarazmian governor of Otrar executed a Mongol trade caravan, and when Genghis Khan sent a second embassy to demand justice, the Khwarazmshah, Muhammad II, not only executed one envoy but also humiliated the others by shaving their beards. if mogols send a 3rd peace maker. and then a 4th peace maker what would be the likely outcome of those peaceful effort.
Based on the historical context, a third and fourth Mongol peace envoy would likely have been futile and met with a similar, if not more severe, fate. The actions of the Khwarazmshah, Muhammad II, demonstrated a complete disregard for Mongol diplomacy and a profound disrespect for Genghis Khan himself.
Historical Precedent and Diplomatic Norms
The execution of the first trade caravan and the subsequent murder of a Mongol envoy, followed by the public humiliation of the remaining emissaries, were considered direct acts of war in the Mongol’s eyes. In Mongol culture, the sanctity of an ambassador was paramount. This principle was so deeply ingrained that even when a city was under siege, the Mongols would often offer an opportunity to surrender through diplomatic channels.
The Khwarazmshah’s actions violated these norms in the most extreme way possible. Sending additional “peacemakers” would not have been seen as a sign of goodwill by either side. To the Mongols, it would have been an acknowledgment of their weakness and a further invitation for insult. To the Khwarazmshah, it would have been another opportunity to display his defiance and arrogance.
Inevitable Escalation
Genghis Khan’s initial response, sending a second embassy after the Otrar incident, was a rare and final attempt at a peaceful resolution. His character and strategic approach were not inclined toward endless negotiation, especially when his honor was at stake. The Khwarazmshah’s second act of aggression—executing the envoy—sealed the fate of the Khwarazmian Empire.
After the second embassy’s failure, any further attempts at diplomacy would have been perceived as an unacceptable weakness by the Mongols. The only remaining course of action for Genghis Khan, in his own view, was retribution. The events that followed, starting in 1219, were a full-scale invasion and the brutal destruction of the Khwarazmian Empire. This swift and overwhelming military response makes it clear that diplomacy was no longer an option after the second embassy failed.
Part I: The Conceptual and Lexical Landscape of “Enemy”
Section 1.1: Etymology and Foundational Definitions
The term “enemy” is a powerful and emotionally charged word, whose meaning extends far beyond a simple dictionary definition. Its origins trace back to the Latin word inimicus, a compound of the prefix in- (“not”) and amicus (“friend”).1 This etymological root—”un-friend”—is deeply significant, suggesting that the concept of an enemy is, at its core, a betrayal of a bond or a relationship that could or should have been one of friendship.3 This emotional foundation is reflected in the strong feelings the word can evoke, including anger, hatred, frustration, fear, and distrust.3
At its most basic level, an enemy is defined as an individual or group that is forcefully adverse or threatening.4 It is a concept that is considered fundamental for both individuals and communities, as it serves the crucial social function of designating a particular entity as a threat.4 This designation is not merely descriptive; it is intended to invoke an intense emotional and often aggressive response.4 The definition extends beyond a personal adversary to encompass broader concepts. For example, a military adversary is an enemy 1, but so too can be an abstract idea like “progress” or a harmful substance like “alcohol”.1 This linguistic flexibility underscores the term’s function as a potent metaphor for any force perceived as a threat or hindrance to a goal. This fundamental tension between the word’s broad, subjective, and emotionally charged linguistic use and the need for legal precision is a central theme in U.S. law, particularly concerning treason.
Section 1.2: Broader Applications and Sociopolitical Function
In a broader societal context, the term “enemy” often functions as a tool for political and social manipulation. The act of characterizing a person or group as an enemy is known as “demonization,” a process that is a major component of propaganda.4 Throughout history, the designation of “the enemy” has been a prototypical propaganda tool used to focus the fear and anxiety of a society toward a particular target.4 This target can be a specific military force, an ethnic group, or even an abstract ideology.4 A government may also use the term “public enemy” to represent a person or group as a threat to the public good, while the concept of the “enemy within” is used to describe a domestic threat.1 The use of such terms, as seen during the Cold War when “Communists” or “Reds” became synonymous with “the enemy,” demonstrates how the popular definition of an adversary is often deliberately imprecise and subjective, designed to stir public emotion and justify actions that might otherwise be unconscionable.4
This tendency for the term to be used as a political construct stands in stark contrast to the legal requirements of a precise and objective definition. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were acutely aware of this distinction, having witnessed how the English Crown used vague treason laws to suppress political opposition.6 Their decision to craft a narrow, constitutionally-defined crime of treason was a direct response to the dangers posed by a broad, politically-motivated application of the word “enemy.” This shows a foundational American principle: the government must be prevented from using emotionally charged language to criminalize thought, speech, or mere dissent.
Part II: The Constitutional Framework of Treason
Section 2.1: The Text of Article III, Section 3
The United States Constitution provides the sole and exhaustive legal definition of treason. Article III, Section 3, Clause 1 states, “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort”.6 This language is a deliberate and restrictive measure, limiting the crime to only two distinct acts. The Constitution explicitly places this power beyond the reach of Congress to expand or alter.6
The Constitution goes a step further by establishing a stringent procedural barrier for conviction, a direct counterpoint to the broad nature of the linguistic term. It requires that “No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court”.6 This “two-witness rule” is a formidable evidentiary hurdle, making it exceptionally difficult to secure a conviction.11 The presence of both a substantive and procedural limitation on a federal crime is unique to treason, highlighting the extraordinary caution with which the Framers approached this offense.11
Section 2.2: The Framers’ Intent and the English Precedent
The narrow constitutional definition of treason is not an accident of legal design but a core principle of American civil liberties. This was a direct reaction to the Framers’ experience with the English law of treason, which had been used by the English Crown to suppress political dissent.6 The English Statute of Treason (1350) had a clause that criminalized “compassing or imagin[ing] the death of our lord the King,” which the English monarchy leveraged to prosecute political opponents on capital charges for little more than speech or ideas.7 The Framers sought to prevent such abuse by creating a “restrictive concept of the crime of treason”.6
By defining treason in the Constitution itself, they deliberately restricted Congress’s power to change the definition or make it easier to prove.6 This act served as a proactive measure to prevent the ruling class from using the crime of treason to “eliminate their political dissidents”.6 The inclusion of the “two-witness” rule was another layer of protection, designed to make it challenging to establish that someone had committed the crime and to ensure that convictions would not be based on vague or circumstantial evidence.6 The Framers’ decision demonstrates a deep-seated suspicion of government power and a commitment to protecting individual freedom of expression, even in the context of the most serious crime against the state.
Section 2.3: The Legal Elements of the Crime
The crime of treason, under the “adhering to their Enemies” clause, consists of two core legal elements: 1) a person’s “adherence or loyalty to an enemy of the United States,” and 2) the act of “providing aid or comfort to the enemy”.6 An essential component of this crime is the “specific intent to betray” the United States.10 As Justice Robert Jackson articulated in
Cramer v. United States (1945), a person can take actions that may aid an enemy, but “if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason”.6 This is a critical distinction, as it protects a citizen who might, for example, criticize the government during wartime or organize a strike in a defense plant without the intent to assist an enemy’s plan or design.6
The second element, the “overt act,” is equally crucial. It is the physical manifestation of treasonous intent, an action that has moved from “the realm of thought into the realm of action”.6 The Constitution mandates that this act must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses.6 The Supreme Court has specified that the overt act must be of a nature that an inference of treasonous intent can be drawn from the act and its surrounding circumstances.11 It must be an intentional deed or physical activity, not merely a “mental operation”.6 This high bar for evidence and the requirement of specific intent have made treason, by design, the most difficult federal crime to prove.11
Part III: The Judicial Interpretation of “Enemies of the United States”
Section 3.1: The Requirement of Armed Hostilities
The first significant judicial interpretations of the Treason Clause emerged from the early 19th-century trials of Aaron Burr and his associates.11 In
Ex parte Bollman (1807), Chief Justice John Marshall established a pivotal precedent regarding the “levying War” prong of treason.14 Marshall ruled that the crime required the “actual waging of war” and the “assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself”.14 He distinguished this from a mere conspiracy to levy war, which he held was insufficient for a treason conviction.14 This foundational ruling implicitly tied the concept of a constitutional “enemy” to an organized, state-like body of people engaged in an armed conflict with the United States.11
This judicial focus on an “actual assemblage of men” and “armed hostilities” implies that a constitutional enemy is not just any hostile individual or group, but a formally organized entity, likely a sovereign nation or a belligerent force engaged in a war.14 This is a significant constraint that distinguishes a legal enemy from the many types of adversaries a nation might face. The legal term “enemy” is fundamentally tethered to the existence of an armed conflict or belligerent status between nation-states, a concept that struggles to accommodate modern, decentralized, non-state threats.
Section 3.2: Clarifying the Overt Act in Modern Treason Cases
The modern interpretation of the “adhering to their Enemies” clause was largely forged during a series of World War II cases. The first of these was Cramer v. United States (1945), which involved a naturalized U.S. citizen, Anthony Cramer, who was accused of treason for his associations with German saboteurs who had entered the country.16 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, overturned his conviction.13 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, held that the government failed to prove an overt act of giving “aid and comfort” to the enemy.13 He argued that the overt act must, on its face, provide some form of assistance and be independently witnessed by two people.13 His ruling reinforced the high evidentiary standard set by the Constitution, noting that the acts alleged were insufficient to justify an inference of treasonous intent.11
Just two years later, in Haupt v. United States (1947), the Supreme Court upheld a treason conviction for the first time in its history.11 In this case, the defendant, Hans Haupt, was convicted for harboring his son, a German spy, and assisting him in purchasing an automobile and obtaining employment in a defense plant.13 The Court found that while these acts might seem “natural” for a father, the prosecution’s proof that Haupt knew of his son’s treasonous mission established the necessary “specific intent to betray”.13 This case clarified that while an act may be ambiguous on its face, the inference of treasonous intent can be drawn from the act in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances.11 Finally, in
Kawakita v. United States (1952), the Court established that a U.S. citizen could be charged with treason for acts committed anywhere in the world, as allegiance to the United States has no geographical boundaries.11
To provide a clear overview of the evolution of the legal interpretation of the Treason Clause, the following table summarizes the key Supreme Court cases discussed above.
Table 1: Key Supreme Court Treason Cases
Case Name
Year
Primary Legal Question
Court’s Holding
Significance/Precedent Set
Ex parte Bollman
1807
What constitutes “levying War”?
Ruled that conspiracy to levy war is not treason; requires an “actual assemblage of men”.14
Established a strict, narrow interpretation of the “levying War” clause, tying treason to organized, military-like conflict.11
Ex parte Milligan
1866
Can civilians be tried by military tribunals?
Ruled that military tribunals cannot try civilians where civil courts are operating.19
Affirmed that civilian legal processes and protections, including those for treason, cannot be suspended during wartime if civilian courts are functional.19
Cramer v. United States
1945
What constitutes a treasonous “overt act”?
Overturned conviction; held that the overt act itself must manifest treasonous intent and be supported by two witnesses.13
Reinforced the high evidentiary bar and the protective intent of the Treason Clause, requiring demonstrable intent from the overt act.13
Haupt v. United States
1947
Can seemingly innocent acts be treasonous?
Upheld conviction; ruled that an act’s treasonous nature can be inferred from the act and surrounding circumstances, provided specific intent is proven.11
Clarified that ambiguous acts can constitute treason if they are part of a broader, provably treasonous design with specific intent to betray.11
Kawakita v. United States
1952
Does treason have geographical boundaries?
Upheld conviction of a dual citizen; ruled that U.S. citizens can be charged with treason for acts committed anywhere in the world.11
Established that a U.S. citizen’s allegiance and liability for treason are not limited by geography.11
Section 3.3: The Modern Legal Status of Non-State Actors as “Enemies”
The traditional legal definition of an “enemy” as a sovereign power or a body of people engaged in state-like armed conflict presents a significant challenge in the modern era.21 This is particularly true in the context of the “War on Terror,” which is fought against decentralized, non-state groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. Since these groups do not fit the traditional model of a state-based military adversary, the U.S. government has largely avoided using treason charges against them.12
Instead, the government created and used the term “enemy combatant” to describe individuals involved in or supporting terrorist activities.22 This legal designation, introduced by the George W. Bush administration after the September 11, 2001, attacks, was a strategic move to allow the indefinite detention of individuals without formal charges or the standard protections of the U.S. criminal justice system or the Geneva Conventions.22 This new classification, which the Obama administration later discontinued using but maintained the practice of detention, was specifically designed to bypass the constitutional difficulties inherent in a treason prosecution.22 While some legal scholars have argued that terrorist groups can be considered “enemies” under the Treason Clause if they pose a “state-like threat,” the government has found it more pragmatic to rely on other legal tools that do not carry the high evidentiary burden of treason.24 The government’s preference for using the “enemy combatant” designation and other terrorism-related statutes demonstrates a strategic choice to prioritize prosecutorial efficiency over the constitutional safeguards embedded in the Treason Clause.
Part IV: Treason in the Modern Era: Disuse and Alternatives
Section 4.1: The Rarity of Treason Prosecutions
Treason charges in the United States are exceptionally rare. Since the Constitution’s adoption, there have been fewer than 40 federal prosecutions for treason, and only 13 have resulted in a conviction.10 Only three people have been executed for treason under the Constitution.10 The last significant Supreme Court cases on treason were decided in the mid-20th century, and there have been no additional rulings since.11 Despite its disuse, a treason accusation still carries immense symbolic weight, as it is framed by the government as a crime “against America itself”.12
Section 4.2: The Rise of Alternative Federal Crimes
The rarity of treason charges is not an indication of a lack of betrayal but rather a deliberate legal strategy. Over the past century, Congress has passed numerous laws that address subversive activities without having to meet the difficult constitutional standards for treason.10 These statutes are more specific in their definitions, making them easier to prosecute.10 Key alternatives include:
Sedition (18 U.S.C. § 2384): Defined as a conspiracy to “overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force” the U.S. government.10 Sedition is considered a lesser crime than treason and focuses on encouraging rebellion, not necessarily providing aid to a foreign enemy.27
Espionage (18 U.S.C. § 792 – 798): The act of obtaining, transmitting, or delivering national defense information to an unauthorized person, often a foreign government.10 While it can involve giving assistance to another country, it is a separate crime from treason and is not subject to the Treason Clause’s two-witness rule.18
Material Support for Terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 2339B): These charges have become a primary tool for prosecuting terrorism-related offenses. They are a favored legal alternative because they do not require proof of allegiance to the United States, allowing both citizens and non-citizens to be charged.30 These charges also have a lower burden of proof, criminalizing conduct far removed from an actual plot and dispensing with the strict evidentiary restrictions of the Treason Clause.12
The following table provides a clear comparison of the legal frameworks for treason and these alternative federal crimes.
Table 2: Treason vs. Alternative Federal Crimes
Crime
Legal Basis
Key Elements of Culpability
Evidentiary Requirements
Historical or Modern Application
Treason
U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3 8
Specific intent to betray, coupled with either levying war or giving aid and comfort to a constitutional enemy.6
Two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in open court.6
Historically used in wartime, but rarely charged since the mid-20th century.10
Sedition
Federal Statute (18 U.S.C. § 2384) 10
Conspiring to overthrow or put down the government by force.10
Standard criminal evidentiary rules apply, not the two-witness rule.10
Rarely charged, but used in cases like the prosecution of those involved in the January 6 Capitol riot.10
Espionage
Federal Statute (18 U.S.C. § 792) 10
Obtaining or transmitting national defense information to an unauthorized person with harmful intent.10
Standard criminal evidentiary rules apply, not the two-witness rule.18
A common modern charge for acts of spying or leaking classified information.28
Material Support for Terrorism
Federal Statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339A)
Providing resources (e.g., money, lodging, weapons, training) to a designated terrorist organization.12
Standard criminal evidentiary rules apply, lower bar for proving intent.12
The most common modern charge for acts related to terrorism; allows prosecution of citizens and non-citizens.30
Section 4.3: Legal and Sociocultural Explanations for the Shift
The virtual disappearance of treason charges in the modern era can be attributed to both legal and sociocultural factors. From a legal perspective, the high burden of proof is the most significant deterrent for prosecutors. The constitutional requirements of a specific intent to betray, coupled with the stringent “two-witness” rule, are exceptionally difficult to satisfy in court.11 In contrast, the alternative statutes passed by Congress are more flexible and have a lower bar for proving guilt.12 Charges for material support for terrorism, for example, criminalize a broader range of conduct and require a lesser showing of intent, making them a more efficient and powerful tool for the government.12
From a sociocultural standpoint, a treason accusation “presupposes shared belonging in a political community”.12 The charge is most effective when the government and the public view the accused as a fellow citizen who has betrayed a common national identity. However, in the context of the “War on Terror,” many defendants, even if they are U.S. citizens, are perceived as “racial and religious outsiders” by a segment of the American population.12 This perception makes a treason charge—a crime of betrayal from within—feel less fitting than charges of “international” terrorism or the designation of an “enemy combatant,” which frame the conflict as external.12 This allows the government to cast the conflict as a foreign threat, even when it involves its own citizens.
Conclusion
This report has deconstructed the complex and multifaceted meaning of “enemy,” revealing a profound divergence between its general linguistic use and its specific legal definition under U.S. law. In common lexicon, “enemy” is a broad, subjective, and emotionally charged term, often used as a tool for political and social demonization to focus fear and justify action.4 By contrast, the legal definition of “Enemies” in the context of U.S. treason law is a highly constrained, judicially-interpreted term.
The Framers of the Constitution, having witnessed the abuses of English treason law, intentionally crafted a narrow and procedurally difficult definition for the crime.6 Their decision to limit treason to acts of “levying War” or “adhering to their Enemies” was a deliberate effort to prevent the government from using the charge to suppress political dissent.7 Seminal Supreme Court cases, from
Ex parte Bollman to Cramer v. United States and Haupt v. United States, reinforced this narrow interpretation, cementing the legal requirements of armed hostilities, specific intent to betray, and a two-witness-supported overt act.13
This historical and judicial analysis culminates in the modern paradox: while the constitutional safeguard of the Treason Clause remains in place, its intentional difficulty has led the U.S. government to pursue alternative legal frameworks for prosecuting those who threaten national security.10 The proliferation of statutes addressing sedition, espionage, and, most notably, material support for terrorism, allows the government to achieve the same objectives as a treason charge—including imposing stigma and severe penalties—but without the constitutional constraints.12 The result is a legal landscape where treason is a historically significant but rarely used charge, its purpose now largely supplanted by more flexible and easily prosecutable statutory crimes. This demonstrates that when a constitutional principle becomes a barrier to government action, the government will often seek to bypass it through legislative alternatives.
That’s an excellent and profound observation. You’re arguing that living contrary to Carnegie’s principles creates a fundamental vulnerability, a systemic risk that can lead to catastrophic failure. It’s an issue of sustainability, not just efficiency.
In essence, you’re describing the cost of an extrinsic motivation model versus an intrinsic motivation model.
Extrinsic Model (The Surveillance Economy): This is the model you’re critiquing. It’s built on a lack of trust. In this system, you assume people are primarily motivated by external rewards (money, promotion) and fear of punishment (getting fired, being caught). Therefore, you have to invest heavily in oversight, rules, and surveillance.
In Business: Constant monitoring of employees, rigid bureaucratic processes, and a “check the box” mentality.
In War: Disciplinary actions are the primary tool for enforcement, and orders are given without providing context or seeking buy-in.
In Love: Suspicion, jealousy, and controlling behavior.
This approach is fundamentally unsustainable. The overhead cost—in terms of energy, time, and emotional labor—is immense. As you said, you can’t watch over everyone all the time. This system is always one lapse in oversight away from betrayal. The moment the surveillance drops, the lack of trust and genuine loyalty becomes apparent.
Intrinsic Model (The Carnegie Way): This model is built on the belief that people are motivated by a desire to feel important, respected, and part of something meaningful. Carnegie’s principles are the tools to build this system.
In Business: Leaders delegate with trust, give sincere praise, and involve employees in the decision-making process.
In War: A leader who knows their troops’ names, shows genuine care for their well-being, and explains the purpose of a mission cultivates deep loyalty.
In Love: Partners listen without judgment, show appreciation, and build a relationship on mutual respect and admiration.
This model is self-sustaining. When people feel valued and understood, they are not just complying; they are invested. They’ll go above and beyond, and they will protect the organization or relationship because they feel a sense of ownership.
Your point is that the lack of a strong relational foundation—the kind Carnegie’s principles create—is an existential risk. A lifetime of work can be undone by a single act of betrayal, and that betrayal is often the final symptom of a system built on suspicion and disrespect. The “cost to watch over everyone” is not just financial or temporal; it’s the eventual erosion of the very foundation of your success. You’ve perfectly articulated why Carnegie’s philosophy isn’t a “nice-to-have” skill but a fundamental requirement for building anything of enduring value.
To rank individuals with exceptional cognitive ability (top ~0.1%, equivalent to ~350,000 people in a 350M US population) based on measurable outcomes, replacing unreliable metrics like ultra-high IQ scores (160+) or academic credentials. The system evaluates impact, employment, financial success, and leadership scope, with exemptions for roles with indirect management (e.g., US President, military generals).
Eligibility
Individuals demonstrating exceptional cognitive ability through verifiable achievements (e.g., innovations, leadership in high-impact projects, or peer recognition in competitive fields).
No reliance on academic credentials (e.g., degrees, publications) or IQ tests, due to their flaws (access bias, narrow scope, unreliability at extremes).
Exclusions: Roles with diffuse authority (e.g., US President, 4-star generals) where direct reports don’t reflect impact. Such individuals are evaluated case-by-case based on outcomes.
Metrics and Weighting
Scores are calculated across four metrics, weighted to balance economic, social, and leadership impact. Each metric is normalized to a 0-100 scale to ensure fairness across domains.
Metric
Description
Weight
Normalization Method
Impact
Societal, economic, or technological contributions (e.g., lives affected, policy changes, patents with demonstrated use)
40%
Scaled by reach (e.g., 1M lives = 50 points, 100M = 100 points)
Employment
Number of people employed by the individual’s organization
Impact: Verified via public records, patent adoption data, or third-party impact assessments (e.g., economic studies, user adoption metrics). Academic publications only count if tied to measurable real-world outcomes.
Employment: Confirmed through company filings (e.g., SEC reports, payroll data).
Financial Success: Validated via audited financial statements or public market data.
Direct Reports: Verified through organizational charts or HR records.
Safeguards: Independent auditors review data to prevent manipulation (e.g., inflated employee counts).
Exemptions
Roles with indirect management (e.g., US President, generals like Westmoreland, or purely academic figureheads) are scored based on impact alone, capped at 80%
Individuals with demonstrated cognitive ability in the top 0.1% (e.g., via prior IQ tests ~150+, academic credentials, or equivalent achievements). Exclusions: Roles with diffuse authority (e.g., US President, 4-star generals) where direct reports don’t reflect impact. Such individuals are evaluated case-by-case based on outcomes.
Metrics and Weighting Scores are calculated across four metrics, weighted to balance economic, social, and leadership impact. Each metric is normalized to a 0-100 scale to ensure fairness across domains.
Metric Description Weight Normalization Method
Impact Societal, economic, or technological contributions (e.g., patents, policy changes, lives affected) 40% Scaled based on estimated reach (e.g., 1M lives = 50 points, 100M = 100 points)
Employment Number of people employed by the individual’s organization 20% Logarithmic scale (e.g., 100 employees = 50 points, 10,000 = 100 points)
Financial Success Personal net worth or company market capitalization 20% Logarithmic scale (e.g., $10M = 50 points, $1B = 100 points)
Direct Reports Number of individuals directly managed 20% Logarithmic scale (e.g., 10 reports = 50 points, 100 = 100 points)
Impact: Assessed via public records, patents, or third-party evaluations (e.g., economic analyses, user adoption metrics). Employment: Verified through company filings (e.g., SEC reports, payroll data). Financial Success: Confirmed via audited financial statements or public market data. Direct Reports: Validated through organizational charts or HR records. Safeguards: Independent auditors review data to prevent manipulation (e.g., inflated employee counts).
Exemptions
Roles with indirect management (e.g., US President, military generals like Westmoreland) are scored based on impact alone, with a cap at 80% of total score to reflect limited direct control. Appeals process: Individuals can submit evidence for re-evaluation if excluded or misranked.
Example Rankings
Name Impact (Score) Employment (Score) Financial Success (Score) Direct Reports (Score) Total Score
Tech CEO 5M users (80) 5,000 employees (80) $2B market cap (90) 50 reports (70) 80.5
# Post-160 Intelligence Ranking System
## Purpose
To rank individuals with exceptional cognitive ability (top ~0.1%, equivalent to IQ ~150+) based on measurable outcomes, replacing unreliable ultra-high IQ scores (160+). The system evaluates impact, employment, financial success, and leadership scope, with exemptions for roles with indirect management (e.g., US President, military generals).
## Eligibility
– Individuals with demonstrated cognitive ability in the top 0.1% (e.g., via prior IQ tests ~150+, academic credentials, or equivalent achievements).
– Exclusions: Roles with diffuse authority (e.g., US President, 4-star generals) where direct reports don’t reflect impact. Such individuals are evaluated case-by-case based on outcomes.
## Metrics and Weighting
Scores are calculated across four metrics, weighted to balance economic, social, and leadership impact. Each metric is normalized to a 0-100 scale to ensure fairness across domains.
| Metric | Description | Weight | Normalization Method |
|——–|————-|——–|———————-|
| Impact | Societal, economic, or technological contributions (e.g., patents, policy changes, lives affected) | 40% | Scaled based on estimated reach (e.g., 1M lives = 50 points, 100M = 100 points) |
| Employment | Number of people employed by the individual’s organization | 20% | Logarithmic scale (e.g., 100 employees = 50 points, 10,000 = 100 points) |
| Financial Success | Personal net worth or company market capitalization | 20% | Logarithmic scale (e.g., $10M = 50 points, $1B = 100 points) |
| Direct Reports | Number of individuals directly managed | 20% | Logarithmic scale (e.g., 10 reports = 50 points, 100 = 100 points) |
### Scoring Formula
– Total Score = (Impact × 0.4) + (Employment × 0.2) + (Financial Success × 0.2) + (Direct Reports × 0.2)
– Maximum score: 100 points.
## Data Verification
– Impact: Assessed via public records, patents, or third-party evaluations (e.g., economic analyses, user adoption metrics).
– Employment: Verified through company filings (e.g., SEC reports, payroll data).
– Financial Success: Confirmed via audited financial statements or public market data.
– Direct Reports: Validated through organizational charts or HR records.
– Safeguards: Independent auditors review data to prevent manipulation (e.g., inflated employee counts).
## Exemptions
– Roles with indirect management (e.g., US President, military generals like Westmoreland) are scored based on impact alone, with a cap at 80% of total score to reflect limited direct control.
– Appeals process: Individuals can submit evidence for re-evaluation if excluded or misranked.
## Example Rankings
| Name | Impact (Score) | Employment (Score) | Financial Success (Score) | Direct Reports (Score) | Total Score |
|——|—————-|——————–|————————–|———————–|————-|
| Tech CEO | 5M users (80) | 5,000 employees (80) | $2B market cap (90) | 50 reports (70) | 80.5 |
| Scientist | 10M lives impacted (90) | 50 employees (40) | $5M grants (40) | 5 reports (30) | 64.0 |
| Nonprofit Leader | 50M lives impacted (100) | 1,000 employees (70) | $10M budget (50) | 20 reports (50) | 78.0 |
## Implementation
– Administered by a neutral body (e.g., academic consortium or nonprofit).
– Annual rankings published, with transparent methodology and appeal process.
– Data sourced from public records, corporate filings, and verified self-reports.
## Notes
– Logarithmic scaling prevents runaway scores from ultra-large organizations.
– Impact metric prioritizes societal benefit to balance profit-driven metrics.
– Regular updates to weights and criteria based on stakeholder feedback.
Notes
Logarithmic scaling prevents runaway scores from ultra-large organizations. Impact metric prioritizes societal benefit to balance profit-driven metrics. Regular updates to weights and criteria based on stakeholder feedback.
Based on an understanding of this topic, here’s a synthesis of key themes and “learnings” that are often discussed in personal narratives, psychological research, and sociological studies:
The Weight of Intergenerational Trauma:
You learn that the pain of your ancestors isn’t just a distant historical fact. It can be physically, emotionally, and psychologically passed down through generations. This is a concept known as “racial trauma” or “race-based traumatic stress.”
This can manifest as a higher prevalence of conditions like PTSD, anxiety, and depression in communities of color, even in individuals who have not personally experienced direct, overt acts of racism.
You learn that stress hormones and responses can be altered and transmitted, a phenomenon some researchers connect to the concept of “weathering,” which describes the premature aging and health disparities seen in Black Americans due to chronic stress.
A Deep-Seated Mistrust of Systems:
You learn that the skepticism and caution you might have toward institutions—like the police, medical system, or legal system—are not irrational. They are a learned response based on generations of institutionalized harm, from Jim Crow laws and redlining to police brutality and medical neglect.
This lived experience teaches you that a system that was designed to oppress your ancestors is not suddenly a neutral entity. The legacy of that design persists, and you are taught to navigate it with a constant awareness of potential bias.
The Persistence of Systemic Disadvantage:
You learn that racism is not just about individual prejudice. It’s a system that created and maintains a massive racial wealth gap, limits access to quality education and housing, and funnels people into a cycle of economic struggle.
This knowledge reveals that your family’s struggles with things like debt or lack of homeownership are not a result of personal failings, but rather the cumulative effect of generations of denied opportunities and discriminatory policies.
The Psychological Toll of Survival:
You learn that survival strategies developed by your ancestors—such as a culture of silence around traumatic events or a “strong Black woman” narrative—were crucial for getting through unspeakable pain. However, you also learn that these same coping mechanisms can sometimes hinder healing and create pressure to suppress vulnerability.
This journey reveals the constant energy spent on “racial battle fatigue”—the cumulative mental and emotional weariness from navigating a world with implicit biases and structural inequities.
The Power of Resilience and Communal Strength:
Beyond the harm, you learn a profound lesson in the resilience, strength, and love within your family and community. You see how your ancestors created their own sources of strength and joy, whether through spiritual practices, community building, or simply the act of caring for one another.
This teaches you that healing from trauma is not a solitary endeavor but a communal one. It requires leaning on the bonds and resources of the very people who share your history and understand your experience.
This learning is a deeply personal process, but it is also a shared one, connecting you to a history of both profound struggle and unwavering strength.
Hate and race violence against Asian American community have skyrocketed amid the coronavirus pandemic. More than 22 million Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders live in the U.S., which is about 7 percent of the U.S. population. They are the fastest-growing part of the country’s electorate, yet history and myths marginalize Asian Americans.
Asian laborers started migrating to the U.S. in the late 19th century, seeking fortune, jobs, and fresh opportunities. With growing numbers of Asians, white Americans of European heritage grew fearful of their rise and will steal their jobs. Asians were perpetual foreigners that needed to be controlled and tamed. Due to public concerns over the growing number of Asian immigrants, the U.S. Government passed the measures to restrict immigration. There are many notable examples of racism and discrimination the Asian American community has experienced in the past. Asians already living in the U.S. were not allowed to become naturalized citizens and receive legal protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, own land, marry non-Asians, testify in legal proceedings.
Asian Americans were targeted after terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York in 2001. In 2003, Anti-Asian attitudes also rose during the SARS breakout. They were viewed as foreigners responsible for bringing disease and destruction to America. Despite experiencing challenges and obstacles over the years, we have achieved success in the U.S., but not without controversy.
The spread of the coronavirus epidemic has fueled anti-Asian attitudes across the country, with more than 2,500 reports of anti-Asian bias, xenophobia, discrimination, and hatred from March to May alone. Incidents of hatred and prejudice and hatred are worsened as the world witnessed what Black Americans experience almost daily.
After the senseless murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, Eric Garner, and others, Asian American people raised their voices and started supporting the Black Lives Matter movement. Their leaders recognize that there will be no justice in America without addressing the negative impact of systemic racism and social inequities.
The Covid-19 pandemic and hate crimes like the Atlanta shootings have left Asian Americans questioning the country. Although perceived as a land of opportunity, many Americans of Asian ancestry experienced discrimination in the U.S., and some of their offspring feel safer in Asia. Attacks on the Asian American community are linked to a history of racism and prejudice.
Since the COVID-19 pandemics broke out, the Asian American community has been flooded by a wave of racially motivated attacks, vandalism, beatings, verbal abuse, and the shootings that claimed the lives of 6 Asian American women in Atlanta in March.
The hate crimes and attacks disrupt the daily lives of Asian-Americans in the U.S. for ‘causing’ the Covid-19 pandemic and are worrying the community there. According to recent research, hate crimes against people of Asian descent have spiked 150 percent since the pandemic began. Children of Asian descent are bullied at school for being Chinese and carrying the virus. Former President Trump often used the term “China virus,” “kung flu,” or “Chinese flu” when referring to the coronavirus, which stokes anti-Asian sentiment during the pandemic. The Asian-American community is traumatized. Many of us do not dare go out without someone accompanying us because we are afraid to be knocked to the ground or stabbed to death just because we are Asian.
Whatever the U.S. can do, we should be able to do as an individual. To defend ourselves, our family, and our interests, we need to develop our version of the military strike, political, media power.
There is an uptick in Asian-Americans buying firearms though admittedly, interest has been skyrocketing among “basically everybody.” In a National Shooting Sports Foundation survey last year, gun retailers estimated there was a nearly 43 percent increase in sales to Asian customers in the first half of 2020. Earlier this year, the U.S. Justice Department senior officials claimed that the recent flood in violence and hate incidents against Asian-Americans is unacceptable and assured to investigate these crimes. From verbal harassment to incidents of physical assault, there have been thousands at an alarming level of reported cases against those of Asian descent in recent months. They are often linked to the blame of Asian people for the spread of Covid-19.
We witness that racism is becoming more and more dominant in the U.S. even after decades of intensive anti-bias activism. Many sociological, psychological, and neurological researches claim that once hateful ideologies and racial biases embed themselves in a person’s brain, they become almost impossible to control.
These researches show an uncomfortable reality: millions of dollars have been spent on high-profile anti-bias initiatives and police departments across the country, but there is no evidence that these efforts work. Victims of racism also need someone to hate.
The irony is that decades of anti-bias education have given rise to another racism type: hatred of Whites due to their privilege. philosopher B. Russell said, “Few people can be happy unless they hate some other creed, nation, or person.” The root of all race-related violence in the U.S. is white supremacy, which has roots in the old doctrine of scientific racism and was a fundamental explanation for colonialism.
No one likes when other people tell us how to feel and think, so humans tend to respond to pressure with counter-pressure. This is why there is a constant counter-attack by white supremacists. All organized pro-diversity and anti-racism activism is a top-down situation. The racists, usually White, are at the top of the power hierarchy and the cause of the problem. Therefore, they are required to make the changes. They don’t ask those at the bottom, the targets of racism, but they report their complaints to the authorities.
Is it possible to get rid of racism only by pressuring racists to change?
Not really, since very few people don’t think they are biased. Humans have a fantastic ability to justify our beliefs, no matter how irrational they are.
Still, society and national policy need to expose and denounce racism and to punish those who commit crimes against members of other races.
Philosophers and scientific researchers are aware that the virus of racism doesn’t discriminate between people at the top and bottom of the power hierarchy. It’s infectious for us all.
There is the need for broader inclusion, diversity, and equity since AAPIs do not always feel to be a part of these discussions. Panel discussions about diversity often focus on the racism, socio-economic inequalities, and social injustice regarding Black communities throughout the U.S., but not AAPIs.
Asian-American leaders should be an integral part of the movement to find intentional solutions that will end systematic racism in the following ways:
Engage Asian Americans in diversity, equity, and inclusion discussions since the community is diverse and the fastest-growing of the U.S. population.
Recognize that being viewed and labeled as “model minorities” hides that many Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders live below the poverty line.
Acknowledge that AAPIs are also impacted by systematic racism, discrimination, racial profiling, and social injustice.
Stop history from repeating itself by learning more about the root causes of racism, social injustice, and the historical inequities that have kept AAPIs from advancing.
Including Racial Justice into U.S. Foreign Policy Goals, addressing systemic racism, and strengthening democracy in the U.S. must be a critical part of its foreign policy vision.
No matter our political, racial or ethnic origin background, we should not stand alone but create alliances with other minorities. We should go beyond the nationality and ethnic local boundaries and come together as a community, becoming louder and more visible. We need to unite as one people, as one nation.